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Generally, the United States Supreme Court interprets the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution1 to imply a negative 
right2 that prevents the government from placing obstacles in the 
path of constitutionally protected speech.3  This interpretation 
focuses on the rights of the speaker, preventing the government from 
restraining protected speech.4  To enforce speech restrictions in 
public forums, the government must withstand strict scrutiny.5 
Another context has emerged, however, where the focus of the 
First Amendment’s protections shifts to an audience’s right to receive 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 1998, 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 2 Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864 (2001). 
The distinction between positive and negative rights is an intuitive one.  
One category is a right to be free from government, while the other is a 
right to command government action.  A ‘positive right is a claim to 
something . . . while a negative right is a right that something not be 
done . . . .’ 
Id. 
 3 See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1360-1461 (14th ed. 2001) (setting forth a discussion of the rights ancillary to 
freedom of speech).  This Comment will rely on the definition of a right as a 
constitutionally protected restraint on government.  See id.  When professing a right, 
the Supreme Court generally relies on negative rights as a way to facilitate a citizen’s 
constitutionally mandated freedoms by preventing certain government action rather 
than requiring it.  Cross, supra note 2, at 860. 
 4 Cross, supra note 2, at 902. 
 5 See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3.  To overcome a test of strict 
scrutiny, the government must show “its action is necessary to achieve a compelling 
interest.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 237 
(2d ed. 2001). 
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information, as opposed to an individual’s rights to speak.6  Since the 
1940s, the Court has referred to a right to receive information7 in 
various contexts.8  In some cases, the right to receive information 
requires the government to provide the press and the public access to 
information uniquely in its possession.9  This implies an affirmative 
governmental act to facilitate speech rather than merely lifting 
barriers to promote free speech.  But American society generally 
dislikes rights that require positive government action.10  For this 
reason, the parameters of the right to receive information have never 
been fully articulated, and the Court has never given the right full 
support.11  As later illustrated, the right is best used when lifting 
barriers to promote free speech. 
In 2003, Justice Breyer addressed the right to receive 
information in his concurring opinion in United States v. American 
Library Association,12 however, that opinion left unresolved the 
strength of the right, and the proper context in which it should be 
applied.13  This Comment will address what the Court’s decision in 
American Library Association signifies for the right to receive 
information and will further provide the best use of the right to 
receive information for the future.  Part I examines the contexts in 
which the right has been invoked, the instability of the right and the 
varying degrees of support it has received over the years.  Part II 
discusses the notion of positive and negative rights as applied to the 
right to receive information.  Part III examines American Library 
Association in detail and discusses where the right stands today.  
 
 6 See William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 
SUP. CT. REV. 303, 306 (1988). 
 7 Id. at 305. 
 8 Id. at 306.  See infra Part I. 
 9 See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); 
Gannet v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 10 See Cross, supra note 2, at 880.  Professor Cross argues that reliance on positive 
rights is not the optimum choice for protecting constitutionally mandated freedoms 
because of the way the U.S. Government works, particularly due to the difficulties the 
judiciary faces in enforcing such rights.  Id. at 862.  The most blatant concern is not 
to undermine the power and legitimacy of the Court.  Id. 
 11 Lee, supra note 6, at 307. 
 12 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 13 The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ignored the right to 
receive information in the analysis.  Only Justice Breyer’s concurrence acknowledged 
the right, and his use of the right does not follow the Court’s previous analysis in 
cases of a similar kind.  Id. at 216.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
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Finally, part IV suggests the strongest context for application of the 
right and how the Court should utilize it in future cases. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INSTABILITY IN APPLICATION  
The Court has invoked the right to receive information in a 
variety of scenarios which can be organized into three categories: (1) 
the use of the right to prevent the government from placing barriers 
between speakers and listeners of constitutionally protected speech; 
(2) the use of the right to require government intervention to 
compel affirmative actions by the press; and (3) the use of the right 
to claim access to information that is in the government’s possession 
due to funding constraints to facilitate the free exchange of 
information and an informed public.14  The second category often 
requires the government to perform an affirmative act to facilitate 
the flow of expression.15  In all contexts, the right is justified as a tool 
to promote the marketplace of ideas and a well-informed public.16 
Scholars have justified the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment in terms of the search for truth and the ability to self-
govern and participate in a democratic government.17  Overarching 
all of the theories, however, is the marketplace of ideas, first 
articulated by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States.18  
Since then, “[s]cholars and jurists frequently have used the image of 
a ‘marketplace of ideas’ to explain and justify the [F]irst 
[A]mendment freedoms of speech and press.”19  The theory 
“ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that 
evolution might lead.”20  As the theory developed, jurists began to 
view the marketplace as an essential tool for participation in 
government or self-government21 by allowing “a free and full 
 
 14 Lee, supra note 6, at 306. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
1, 2-6 (1984). 
 17 See id. 
 18 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).  “[T]he best test of truth is the power of thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”  Id. 
 19 Ingber, supra note 16, at 2. 
 20 Id. at 3.  The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor to describe the way in which 
the Court has found two corollary rights.  Pico, 457 U.S. at 867.  The sellers, or the 
speaker of the information, have the freedom to speak.  Ingber, supra note 16, at 4.  
In order to make their freedom effective, the buyers, or the receivers of information, 
must also have a freedom to receive it.  Id. 
 21 Ingber, supra note 16, at 4.  To protect a democracy and self-government, 
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competition of ideas within the community, rather than by 
paternalistic state-sponsored efforts to protect citizens from the ill 
effects of bad ideas.”22  Going hand in hand with the marketplace of 
ideas are the theories of a well-informed public, individual autonomy, 
and uninhibited debate.23 
Justice Brennan explored the right to receive information in his 
concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General.24  The Justice stated, “I 
think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right.  
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise 
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”25  
Justice Brennan further pointed out that the government’s job is not 
to monitor and decide for citizens what information they should 
receive.26  Instead, the government should merely facilitate the 
process and only assist a citizen in ridding himself or herself of 
unwanted communication when that citizen specifically requests such 
assistance.27  This theory tends to persuade the Court in that it does 
not differentiate amongst the type of speech the First Amendment 
protects; therefore the Court has accepted the premise in numerous 
cases.  It is a broad interpretation of freedom to speak and listen and 
“generally requires government to avoid making subjective value 
judgments about either the specific content of speech or the means 
of communication.”28  Ultimately, those jurists would subscribe to a 
broad interpretation of free speech and “believe that if only 
 
citizens need the ability to access as much information as possible to make informed 
choices.  Id. at 8.  This is necessary to facilitate assessment of political candidates and 
political issues, influence government, hold governmental officials accountable and 
enable dissent when necessary.  Id. 
 22 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword and the First 
Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L. 
REV. 905, 914 (1998). 
 23 Id. 
 24 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 25 Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall are 
historically the strongest proponents of a strong right to receive information.  See, 
e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. 853; Lamont, 381 U.S. 301. 
 26 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308. 
 27 Id.  Ideally, the government should only act when a citizen requests assistance; 
however, the statute in Lamont required the government to act paternalistically and 
decide for citizens what information they should or should not receive.  Id.  Not only 
does this fail to give citizens enough freedom in their personal affairs, but it also puts 
the government in a position to act rather than step back and allow the flow of 
information.  Id. at 310.  Striking down the statute in Lamont ensured citizens’ ability 
to continue to be self-governing.  Id. 
 28 Krotoszynski, supra note 22, at 915. 
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government can be kept away from ‘ideas,’ the self-operating force of 
‘[f]ull and free discussion’ will promote ideas that are ‘true to our 
genius’ and keep us from ‘embracing what is cheap and false.’”29 
A. Government Barriers 
1. Restrictions on speech struck down due to audience 
interest 
A number of cases invoke the right to receive information to 
prevent governmental obstacles to the dissemination of information.30  
One of the earliest cases, Martin v. City of Struthers,31 involved a 
Jehovah’s Witness who walked door-to-door ringing doorbells to 
publicize a religious meeting,32 and in doing so, violated a city 
ordinance barring the distribution of “handbills, circulars or other 
advertisements” through door-to-door solicitation.33  In announcing 
the opinion of the Court, Justice Black stressed the broad scope of 
the freedom of speech and press and found that it “embraces the 
right to distribute literature and necessarily protects the right to 
receive it.”34  In coming to this conclusion, the Court balanced the 
rights of the speaker and the rights of the individual householder 
against the interests of the entire community.35  In the end, the 
interests of the speaker and the potential audience prevailed, as the 
individual householders must be given the opportunity to choose 
whether to listen to the speaker’s message, rather than having the 
community choose for them.36 
The ordinance in Martin stood as a barrier to protected 
 
 29 Ingber, supra note 16, at 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Dennsi v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 30 See e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (barring a company-owned 
town from imposing criminal punishment on a person who was distributing religious 
literature); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (prohibiting a state from 
taxing Jehovah’s Witnesses for spreading or selling religious literature as an 
unconstitutional violation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ First Amendment rights). 
 31 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
 32 Id. at 142. 
 33 Id.  The purpose of the ordinance was to prevent unsolicited visitors from 
distributing information, including, but not limited to, commercial information.  Id.  
The City of Struthers cited peace, order and comfort of the community as reasons for 
the ordinance.  Id. at 144. 
 34 Id. at 143. 
 35 Martin, 319 U.S. at 143. 
 36 Id. at 144. 
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communications.37  Justice Black pointed out that this barrier can act 
to prevent “dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best 
traditions of free discussion.”38  The Court emphasized that 
“[f]reedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he 
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free 
society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of 
time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.”39  
Importantly, Martin marks the first time the Court has considered the 
right to receive information.  While the Court did not expressly rely 
upon this right in its holding, Martin represents the first step towards 
the Court’s recognition of the right.  The Court determined the 
proper use of the right to receive information was to allow a free 
exchange of ideas without government intervention to mold the 
nature of those ideas or to protect citizens from undesirable 
information.40 
Two years later, the Court noted the right in Thomas v. Collins.41  
In Thomas, a Texas district court enjoined a union president and 
labor organizer from soliciting members for labor union 
membership.  His actions violated a Texas statute because he did not 
properly obtain an organizer’s card.42  Because Thomas had not 
registered with the State, the district court prevented him from 
making a public speech regarding the merits of joining a union.43 
The Court’s holding in Thomas, although narrow as it only 
related to Thomas’s particular circumstances, clarifies the Court’s 
 
 37 Id.  The two parties whose rights were at issue were the speaker and the person 
whose doorbell the speaker rang.  Id.  The Court found it is necessary to protect both 
sides when protecting speech in this category.  Id. 
 38 Id. at 145. 
 39 Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47.  This statement would lead to the conclusion that 
the Court’s interest in protecting the right would require strict scrutiny, thus giving 
the right a strong status.  Id.  From Justice Black’s language, the inference can be 
drawn that only a compelling governmental interest, i.e., public health and safety, 
would prevent a citizen from soliciting door to door.  Id. at 147.  In this case, there 
were other ways to satisfy health and safety concerns, such as trespass ordinances, 
while still allowing citizens to make their own choice about the information being 
offered.  Id. at 147-48. 
 40 Id. at 148. 
 41 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 42 Id. at 519; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1943).  The Legislature designed section 5 
to allow Texas to maintain closer control of union activity.  Thomas, 323 U.S. at 519.  
The statute required union organizers to file a written request by mail before 
attempting to solicit new members in Texas.  § 5. 
 43 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 522. 
  
2005 COMMENT 795 
 
 
position regarding the right to receive information.44  The Court, in 
dicta, emphasized Thomas’s right to speak and the public’s right to 
hear his message.45  The Court found a restraint on free speech, thus 
determining the restriction is “so destructive of the right of public 
discussion, without greater or more imminent danger to the public 
interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the freedoms 
secured by the First Amendment.”46  Thomas had a right to inform 
the public about the merits of joining a union, and the government 
could not restrain him from doing so.47  The government, in 
attempting to prevent the speech, violated both Thomas’s right to 
speak and the audience’s right to hear his message.48  “That there was 
a restriction upon Thomas’ right to speak and the rights of the 
workers to hear what he had to say, there can be no doubt.”49  
Accordingly, Thomas had a right to give his speech, free from 
governmental restraint.50  Again, as in Martin, the Court did not rely 
on the right to receive information, but set the stage for future 
analysis.  Both Martin and Thomas are often cited as the precursors to 
use of the right to receive information as a basis for holdings striking 
down restraints on free speech.51 
By the time the Court decided Lamont v. Postmaster General,52 the 
 
 44 Id. at 534.  The Court stressed that the holding did not facially invalidate the 
Texas statute.  Id. at 518.  Instead, the Court viewed the case in the context of 
Thomas making a public speech.  Id. at 533.  The Court did not extend the Texas 
statute to allow the prevention of public speech.  Id. at 534.  Because Thomas did not 
actually sign up any new members, the Court was able to narrowly construe his 
actions as merely a speech on the merits of union membership.  Id. at 533.  If 
Thomas had actually signed up any new members, the Court would likely have found 
he violated the Texas statute and may have ruled differently.  Thomas, 323 U.S. at 
533. 
 45 Id. at 534.  Thomas merely made a speech in Texas.  Id.  The Court refused to 
force a speaker to register with the Texas government in order for the speaker to 
enjoy the freedom to speak, and for the attendees to enjoy the corollary right to hear 
the message.  Id. 
 46 Id. at 537. 
 47 Id. at 532.  See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940) (affirming 
rights of union members to picket and disseminate information); Senn v. Tile Layers 
Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (affirming rights of union members to 
assemble and speak). 
 48 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 534. 
 49 Id. at 534. 
 50 Id. at 536. 
 51 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969). 
 52 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
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Court had mentioned the right to receive information but had not 
yet used it to form the basis of an opinion.53  In Lamont, the Court 
faced a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 305(a) of the 
Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962.54  The 
relevant part of the statute permitted the Postal Service to detain 
“communist political propaganda” until the addressee requested the 
mail be sent.55  Each piece of mail required an affirmative action on 
the part of the addressee to send a reply card alerting the Post Office 
of the addressee’s desire to receive the mail.56 
The Court struck down the statute as an unnecessary restraint on 
free speech.57  Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, found that the 
government’s actions amounted to an unnecessary restraint on free 
speech and the corollary right to receive information.58  In Lamont, 
the Court’s primary concern related to the additional burden placed 
on a citizen to receive information, thus continuing the theme in 
Thomas.  By requiring an additional step by the addressee to obtain 
his mail, the “regime of this Act is at war with the ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are contemplated 
by the First Amendment.”59  The Court equated the government’s 
attempt in Lamont to control the flow of the mail to the attempt in 
 
 53 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945). 
 54 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a) (1962).  The statute gave the Postmaster General the 
power to detain any mail, except sealed letters, that the Secretary of the Treasury 
deemed to be communist political propaganda.  Id.  The addressee would then be 
notified and would have to submit a written request for delivery to receive the mail.  
Id.  The statute further laid out a definition of “communist propaganda” to assist the 
Postal Service in making such decisions to detain certain pieces of mail.  § 4008(c). 
 55 Id.  Leading up to this case, in the 1940s and 1950s, United States citizens and 
the United States Government were fearful of Communism and its potential impact 
on our country.  ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS 9-15 (1994).  Adding to these fears at the beginning of the Cold War 
were the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities 
Committee.  Id.  “From the State Department and Congress to the Post Office and 
the Supreme Court, federal bureaucrats, politicians, and judges struggled with the 
issues of domestic communism as they debated and implemented policies to deal 
with it.”  Id. 
 56 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 303. 
 57 Id. at 307. 
 58 Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).  See also Thomas, 323 U.S. at 534. 
 59 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964)).  The Court encountered a First Amendment issue in New York Times 
regarding allegedly libelous statements printed about an elected official from 
Alabama.  376 U.S. at 256. 
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Thomas to control the flow of ideas.60  As the recipient of the mail 
must have affirmatively acted to receive the mail in question, the 
government was indirectly burdening the flow of information as it did 
in Thomas.61  This burden was an impermissible restraint on the 
recipient’s right to receive information. 
That same year, in Griswold v. Connecticut,62 a plurality of the 
Court demonstrated its concern not only with protecting the First 
Amendment rights of doctors and patients, but also the right to 
privacy for actions occurring in a citizen’s home.  In Griswold, the 
government attempted to create a barrier between a citizen and 
constitutionally protected information relating to the private affairs 
of a husband and wife, thus violating the citizen’s right to receive 
information.  The appellants in the case were the executive director 
and medical director for the New Haven location of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut.63  The claims at issue related to 
the constitutionality of two Connecticut statutes, which prohibited 
the use and dissemination of contraception.64  Striking down the 
statutes, Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality, implicated the First 
Amendment as a barrier to the government interfering in the 
“intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in 
one aspect of that relation.”65 
Justice Douglas opined 
In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of 
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available 
knowledge.  The right of freedom of speech and press includes 
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, 
the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, 
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach–indeed the freedom 
of the entire university community.66 
Justice Douglas stressed the importance of the right of privacy and 
 
 60 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306. 
 61 Id. 
 62 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 63 Id. at 480.  One purpose of Planned Parenthood was to give “information, 
instruction and medical advice” to prevent conception.  Id. 
 64 Id.  The Connecticut statutes provided for fine or imprisonment for use of 
contraception or for providing and assisting with the use of contraception.  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958). 
 65 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. 
 66 Id.  See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957); Weiman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 
(1943). 
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right of association.67  More specifically, the plurality found that the 
right to receive requested constitutionally protected information is 
one form of facilitating a citizen’s right to privacy in conducting his 
personal affairs.68 
A few other cases within the category of governmental barriers 
also relate specifically to the relationship between the right to receive 
information and the rights to liberty and privacy.69  In Stanley v. 
Georgia,70 the Court ventured into new territory, protecting the “right 
to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.”71  
In Stanley, the state of Georgia investigated Stanley for bookmaking 
activities.72  While conducting a search of Stanley’s home, agents 
found an obscene film.73  Following his arrest, a jury convicted Stanley 
of possession of obscene matter.74  The issue before the United States 
Supreme Court regarded the constitutionality of the Georgia statute 
prohibiting private possession of obscene matter.75 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, used the right to 
receive information as a basis to strike down the Georgia statute.76  
Recognizing the government’s interest in regulating obscene 
information, Justice Marshall also affirmed that such interest is not 
always paramount.77  The Court based its holding on the right to 
 
 67 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning a statute 
prohibiting a parochial school teacher from teaching German to students who had 
not completed eighth grade, finding a violation of student and teacher liberty). 
 70 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 71 Id. at 564.  This case is the first and last time the Court allowed any kind of 
protection of information deemed obscene.  See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 
(1990) (refusing to apply the principles set forth in Stanley, stating that the 
government’s compelling interest in regulating child pornography outweighed the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights).  There is an argument that the Court is not truly 
protecting obscene information, but rather the Court is protecting the right to have 
that information in a citizen’s home.  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 72 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558. 
 73 Id.  The statute at issue was GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).  The statute 
deemed possession or distribution of obscene materials a felony.  Id.  The statute 
defined obscene matter as “applying contemporary community standards, its 
predominant appeal is prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, 
sex or excretion.”  Id. 
 74 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 563. 
 77 Id.  Justice Marshall dismissed Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) as 
dispositive, despite the holding in the case that obscene information is not 
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receive information, coupled with the “fundamental . . . right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted 
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”78  Given the nature of 
the regulation regarding speech that is not constitutionally protected 
and Justice Marshall’s statement that “it is now well established that 
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas,” 
the Court gave the right its strongest endorsement.79  It is also 
important to note that Justice Marshall could have reached the 
holding in this case without referencing the right to receive 
information.  This fact makes the Justice’s endorsement of the right 
even stronger as Justice Marshall chose to include the right to receive 
information is his analysis, even though it was not necessary. 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.,80 a statute prevented pharmacists from “publishing, 
advertising, or promoting” the price of a prescription drug.81  The 
Court found that the statute was an impermissible restraint on 
commercial speech and the patients’ right to receive information.82  
This case both affirmed the protection of commercial speech and the 
Court’s continued protection of the right to receive information.83  
Justice Blackmun opined that “[f]reedom of speech presupposes a 
willing speaker.  But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the 
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its 
 
constitutionally protected information.  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560.  The Justice found 
that the Roth decision could not be the only factor in determining whether a statute 
that prohibits private possession of material is unconstitutional.  Id. at 564.  Justice 
Marshall viewed this as more than a case of preventing obscenity but a case of a 
citizen’s private possessions.  Id. 
 78 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.  This case is an example of the government striking 
down a paternalistic statute.  See Brian Verbon Cash, Images of Innocence or Guilt?: The 
Status of Laws Regulating Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in Alabama and an 
Evaluation of the Case Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REV. 793, 811-12 (2000).  
Stanley “was based on a paternalistic interest in regulating thoughts out of fear that 
obscenity would ‘poison the minds of its viewers’ and hurt public morality.”  Id. 
(citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1990)). 
 79 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. 
 80 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 81 Id. at 750.  The Virginia Statute allowed the state to charge a pharmacist with 
unprofessional conduct if he issued, published, or broadcasted any information 
about prices for prescription drugs. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). 
 82 Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 772.  This case is not the first to 
announce First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  See, e.g., Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Bread v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
 83 Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 772. 
  
800 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:789 
 
 
recipients both.”84 
Finding a solid basis in the free flow of ideas and information, 
Justice Blackmun concluded that commercial speech is protected in 
order to shelter consumers.85  The Court held that governmental 
barriers to dissemination of this kind of information will not be 
tolerated.  In First National Bank v. Bellotti,86 the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited businesses 
from publicizing views regarding questions posed on an election 
ballot.87  Protecting corporate expression and the rights of businesses 
to disseminate information, the Court struck down the law.88  In 
discussing the reasoning behind the holding, Justice Powell found 
that “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and 
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public 
may draw.”89  The public has a right to gather all possible 
information, despite its source, to make an effective judgment in 
private affairs, thus promoting and enhancing the idea of self-
government.90 
2. Uphold speech restrictions because other rights 
outweigh audience rights 
While this first category of cases supports the right to receive 
information, there are a few cases where a separate right proves more 
powerful.  For example, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,91 Stanford University 
 
 84 Id. at 756. 
 85 Id.  Sheltering consumers is one form of a paternalistic government the Court 
is unwilling to accept.  Id. at 770.  Rather than allowing consumers to evaluate the 
information prohibited by the statute, the government is making that decision for 
consumers, thus keeping them in ignorance.  Id.  The Court does not find this type 
of restriction an acceptable way for the government to achieve its interests.  Id. 
 86 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 87 Id. at 769.  The Massachusetts statute was designed to prevent businesses from 
using influence and heightened resources to disseminate political views unless the 
issue specifically related to the corporation’s business.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, 
§ 8 (West Supp. 1977). 
 88 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
 89 Id. at 783. 
 90 Id.  The government should be prevented from denying citizens the right to 
receive information merely because of the source of the information, unless there is 
a compelling interest.  Id.  If a corporation’s management has views on a subject, the 
public has a right to hear those views and evaluate them.  Id.  Preventing 
dissemination of those views essentially makes decisions for citizens about what 
information is important in evaluating the issue in question.  Id. 
 91 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
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students invited Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen and Marxist scholar, 
to lecture at a conference; nonetheless, the United States denied his 
entrance into the country.92  He was forced to give his lecture via 
telephone rather than in person.93  The Court refused to extend the 
right to receive information to compel Congress to allow a visiting 
lecturer from another country to attend an academic conference,94 
regardless of the fact that Congress’s denial of his visa stemmed from 
a dislike of Mandel’s political views.95  Despite the fact that the 
students could not hear Mr. Mandel’s remarks in person, the Court 
determined Congress’s refusal did not infringe the First Amendment 
rights of the Americans who invited him.96  The opinion recognized 
the First Amendment right to receive information, but held that it 
did not override Congress’s right to exclude aliens from entry into 
the country.97 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, saw the case as a clear-cut violation 
of the First Amendment,98 and opined that “[t]he activity of speakers 
becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital 
interchange of thought is the ‘means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth.’  Its protection is ‘a fundamental 
principle of the American government.’”99  Justice Marshall opposed 
the Court’s analysis and found the Court balanced the competing 
interests incorrectly, therefore infringing on the listener’s rights.100 
 
 92 Id. at 759. 
 93 Id.  Mr. Mandel, a Belgian journalist and author of a book entitled Marxist 
Economic Theory was invited by students to speak at a conference on Technology and the 
Third World at Stanford University.  Id. at 756.  Mr. Mandel then applied to the 
American Consul in Brussels under federal law to obtain permission to enter the 
United States.  Id. at 757.  His application was denied.  Id. 
 94 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 754. 
 95 Id. at 762. 
 96 Id. at 765. 
 97 Id. at 764. The Court found that Congress, in enacting statutes to regulate 
entry into the country, had a compelling governmental interest that outweighed the 
students’ right to receive Mr. Mandel’s information in the form of a live speech.  Id. 
at 765.  While the Court does not ultimately dispose of the case using the right to 
receive information, it is important to note that the right is still viable and that strict 
scrutiny is applied when the right is threatened.  Id. 
 98 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 775.  Again showing Justice Marshall’s unwavering 
support for First Amendment rights, the Justice would have found that Congress’s 
rationale was not compelling enough to overtake the students’ First Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 785. 
 99 Id. at 775-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id.  Justice Marshall criticizes the majority for only allowing a “[m]erely 
‘legitimate’ governmental interest[]” to “override constitutional rights.”  Id. at 777.  
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B. Government action requiring affirmative acts by the Press 
1. Uphold affirmative speech requirements out of 
concern for audience rights 
The Court has only used the right to receive information to 
require an affirmative act by speakers in a handful of cases.101  The 
first, Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission,102 
involved a Constitutional challenge to the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine 
and section 315 of the Communications Act requiring “that [a] 
discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and 
that each of those issues must be given fair coverage.”103  Relying 
heavily on the fact that broadcast frequencies are scarce, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine.104  The Court 
found that the Fairness Doctrine enhanced the freedoms associated 
with freedom of speech and the press.105  The crux of the argument 
rested on the notion that the right of free speech does not allow a 
broadcaster to ignore the free speech of others given the scarcity of 
 
Justice Marshall, as evidenced in later cases, is the strongest proponent for strong use 
of the right to receive information.  See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); 
Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 101 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94 (1973).  All three decisions reject “the argument that broadcast facilities 
should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public 
issues.”  CBS, 412 U.S. at 105.  These cases do not discuss the right to receive 
information or issues of scarcity, but deal with whether the public forum doctrine 
should be extended to public television broadcasting.  Id.  While the analysis is 
different, the result conflicts with the analysis in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969).  See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.  It is also important 
to note, however, that the Court in League of Women Voters implied that the 
government may treat broadcasting differently from other media, thus not 
completely turning away from Red Lion.  League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376-77, 
380, 402.  The Court in Forbes further implied that candidate debates required a 
special analysis and are an exception to the above stated rule requiring strict scrutiny.  
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675.  Lastly, the Court in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), 
continued to recognize the fact that broadcasting is treated differently than other 
forms of media expression.  Id. at 867. 
 102 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 103 Id. at 369.  The Fairness Doctrine and a provision of the Communications Act, 
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1967), place requirements on broadcasters.  47 U.S.C. § 315.  The 
FCC’s Fairness Doctrine deals with personal attacks in the context of controversial 
public issues and political editorializing.  Id.  Section 315 of the Communications Act 
requires broadcasters to provide candidates with equal airtime to discuss their views.  
Id. 
 104 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392-93. 
 105 Id. at 393. 
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the broadcast frequencies.106  The Court posited that “[i]t is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by 
the Government itself or a private licensee.” 107 
The government’s mandate required an affirmative act on the 
part of the broadcasters, essentially taking away the broadcasters’ 
right to make certain choices relating to content.108  The Court found 
that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is 
crucial here.  That right may not constitutionally be abridged either 
by Congress or by the FCC.”109  In another medium, this analysis 
would more than likely fail. 
The Court also upheld a restraint on a broadcaster’s freedom to 
choose editorial content in CBS v. Federal Communications 
Commission.110  Petitioner CBS sought to invalidate a provision of the 
Communications Act111 as an impermissible restraint on its free 
speech and ability to choose editorial content.112  The statute 
provided that the FCC may revoke a broadcaster’s license “for willful 
or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit 
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting 
station . . . by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office 
 
 106 Id.  The Court justified the different First Amendment standards due to the 
different mediums that supply information.  Id. at 386.  Based on the universal reach 
of a radio signal and the highly technical nature of the medium, the Court found the 
government had significant interest in regulating the forum.  Id. at 387.  
Furthermore, because broadcast radio reaches large audiences, the government must 
intervene to allow radio to be used effectively.  Id. at 389.  Without government 
regulation the hope for intelligible information is lost, as too many people will be 
competing to use the same broadcast frequencies.  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.  
Therefore, it is an unfortunate consequence that certain willing broadcasters will be 
turned away due to scarce resources.  Id.  See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622 (1994). 
 107 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
 108 Id.  Normally the right of the press would overshadow any requirements the 
government may impose.  Because of the difficulty in entering the broadcasting 
market and the limited number of broadcast channels, however, the Court chose to 
protect the public’s right to receive both sides of a story rather the press’s right to 
choose content.  Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389. 
 109 Id. at 390.  The Court is explaining the rationale behind allowing the Fairness 
Doctrine.  Id. 
 110 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
 111 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). 
 112 CBS, 453 U.S. at 373-74. 
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on behalf of his candidacy.”113  After the networks denied the Carter-
Mondale Presidential Committee’s request for airtime relating to 
President Carter’s formal announcement of his candidacy, the 
campaign filed a complaint with the FCC alleging the networks 
violated section 312(a)(7)’s reasonable access requirement.114 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and the 
Carter-Mondale charge.115  Citing Red Lion, the Court found, 
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no 
constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to 
monopolize a . . . frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.  
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the 
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with 
others . . . .116 
In other words, broadcast media is different from other media, 
therefore the government was allowed to step in and ensure that all 
viewpoints are heard.117  The Court noted that “[s]ection 312 (a)(7) 
[sic] thus makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression 
by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to 
receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the 
democratic process.”118 
2. Striking down speech requirements because audience 
interest is met otherwise 
In contrast, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. Division of Knight 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo,119 the Court struck down, as a restraint on 
freedom of press, a Florida statute that required a newspaper to give 
an opportunity for reply to a person running for office if the 
newspaper published a criticism about that candidate.120  The tension 
 
 113 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).  The stated purpose of the Act was to “give candidates 
for public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their 
stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters.”  CBS, 
453 U.S. at 379 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-96, at 20 (1971)). 
 114 Id. at 373-74. 
 115 Id. at 397. 
 116 CBS, 453 U.S. at 395 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389). 
 117 Id. at 396.  See also CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(observing the competing interests of the role of the government and the role of the 
press). 
 118 CBS, 453 U.S. at 396. 
 119 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 120 Id. at 257.  The “Right to Reply Statute,” FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973), provided a 
candidate running for public office the opportunity to reply to any negative 
commentary in any newspaper about that candidate’s personal character or official 
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between the right to receive information and the free flow of 
information versus the freedom of the press is epitomized in this 
case.  The right of the press ultimately prevailed.  The Court found it 
was no longer the right of listeners that are “paramount” once the 
scarcity issue, as seen in Red Lion, was no longer a factor.121  The Court 
concluded that 
[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply 
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo 
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the 
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment 
because of its intrusion into the function of editors.122 
This case shows a clear boundary over which the Court is unwilling to 
step.  This case also shows a limitation of the right to receive 
information in the context of the government requiring an 
affirmative act by the press to disseminate information where there 
are no scarcity of resource issues due to the government’s action in 
giving broadcasters a monopoly over broadcast frequencies. 
 
C. Claim of access to information in government’s possession 
Libraries/Book Removal 
In Board of Education v. Pico,123 the Court encountered a local 
New York board of education decision to remove certain 
“objectionable” books from the libraries of the junior and senior high 
schools.124  The school board, a state agency and government actor, 
made a decision to remove the books in order to “protect the 
 
record.  Id. 
 121 Id. at 258.  This analysis is dominant in press cases where the Court balances 
audience’s right to receive information and the freedom of the press to choose 
content.  Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 124 Id. at 872.  The Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School 
District Number 26 determined that the books in question were “anti-American, anti-
Christian and anti-Semitic.”  Id. at 857.  The books at issue at Island Trees High 
School were Slaughter House Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape by Desmond 
Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited 
by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, of anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy by Oliver 
LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ But A Sandwich by Alice 
Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver.  Id.  The book at issue at Island Trees 
Memorial Junior High School was A Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer.  Id. 
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children in our schools from this moral danger.”125  All of the books 
were constitutionally protected and did not fall into any of the 
categories of unprotected speech.126  A district court judge noted that 
the record indicated that the Board of Education chose to remove 
the particular books in question to make an example.  The Board’s 
motivation was to establish “proper” views and tastes for children, 
rather than to protect their welfare.127 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by 
two other Justices, began by acknowledging a school board’s broad 
discretion in making content-based education decisions.128  It also, 
however, confirmed secondary students’ right to receive information 
through reading as an essential part of a student’s freedom to 
inquire.129  Because the students’ rights and those of the school board 
may be in conflict, the Court fell short of recognizing the school 
board’s absolute discretion, finding the board may not infringe upon 
the students’ rights.130  Specifically, the plurality determined that 
book removal from school libraries is limited by the students’ First 
Amendment rights:131  “[W]e think that the First Amendment rights 
of students may be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of 
books from the shelves of a school library.”132  Apparently, as one 
commentator has noted, the Court is especially concerned with the 
removal of previously available books and believes that “[a]n 
unshelving implicates the right to receive information because the 
 
 125 Id. at 857. 
 126 Id. at 857 n.2. 
 127 Id. at 861. 
 128 Pico, 457 U.S. at 863. 
 129 Id. at 866. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 872.  Book removal in public libraries is a frequently debated topic.  See 
generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253 (1992); Linda L. Berger, Government Owned Media: The 
Government as Speaker and Censor, 35 CASE W. RES. 707 (1985); Martin D. Munic, 
Education or Indoctrination – Removal of Books from Public School Libraries, 68 MINN. L. 
REV. 213, 237 (1983).  The Court has previously recognized a library staff’s broad 
discretion is choosing appropriate content, citing the resource issue as the primary 
rationale.  See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923).  Libraries would be unable to house all of the information available, 
and Courts are unable to step in and regulate the choices that the library is forced to 
make.  Pico, 457 U.S. at 866.  Once a library does choose to obtain a book, however, 
the First Amendment rights of the patrons are implicated when a library chooses to 
make that book unavailable.  Id. 
 132 Pico, 457 U.S. at 866. 
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state is hindering access to information previously available.”133 
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, reaffirmed the 
Constitutional protection of the right to receive information:134 
This right is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and 
press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, in two 
senses.  First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from 
the sender’s First Amendment right to send them: The right of 
freedom of speech and press embraces the right to distribute 
literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it.  The 
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing 
addressees are not free to receive and consider them.  It would be 
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no 
buyers.135 
Once the library makes the books available, the right to receive 
information is implicated if those books are later taken away.136  The 
Court remanded the case for further fact-finding regarding the 
motivations behind removal of the books, holding that the students’ 
First Amendment right to receive information is implicated by 
improperly motivated removal.137   
The right to receive information, however, is not as strongly 
supported by Pico as might first appear.  One of the Justices who 
supported remand, Justice Blackmun, did not consider the right in 
his discussion.  He was more concerned with discrimination against 
ideas and the Board of Education’s improper motives.138  The fifth 
vote for remand, Justice White, refused to consider the scope of the 
student’s First Amendment rights, reasoning that such discussions 
were premature until the facts regarding the board’s motives had 
been clarified.139  Even the plurality opinion qualified the right by 
narrowly holding that the student’s First Amendment right is only 
violated when the decision to remove a book is provoked by the 
school board’s aversion to the ideas pronounced in the works in 
 
 133 Munic, supra note 131, at 237. 
 134 Pico, 457 U.S. at 866.  The student’s right to receive information is at issue.  Id.  
Students’ First Amendment rights have previously been recognized, including the 
right to receive more information than that which the State chooses to 
communicate.  See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 135 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (internal quotations omitted).  See also Lamont, 381 U.S. at 
308; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
 136 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867. 
 137 Id. at 875. 
 138 Id. at 878. 
 139 Id. at 884. 
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question.140  This reasoning thereby forms a narrow right in the 
context of school libraries. 
Chief Justice Burger rejected the right recognized by the 
plurality on grounds that it would involve an affirmative right to have 
the government provide this information.141  This, however, 
mischaracterizes the right to receive information in the library 
context.  What is really involved is a right to maintain the status quo 
to insure there is no improper removal of the library materials.  In 
the instance where the government chooses to restrict materials once 
those materials are publicly offered, as in Pico, then an action to 
compel the government to reacquire those materials will rely on a 
negative right rather than a positive one.142  Once the government 
chooses to obtain and make information public, the government is 
then unable to take it away for an improper purpose.143  Without the 
government’s initial choice to offer information through the library, 
an action to compel the offering would rely on a positive right.144  
Once the government has chosen to acquire the materials, however, 
the right to compel the offering becomes negative.145  Since this 
Comment is focused on those materials previously offered, the right 
to receive information would rely on a negative right.  The removal of 
books previously offered goes to the heart of the right to receive 
information.146  The state should not be permitted to choose to 
communicate certain ideas nor remove those ideas from the public 
once they have been offered. 
Both Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist in their 
dissents refused to recognize the right to receive information in the 
context of junior and senior high schools.147  Neither Justice, however, 
expressly stated that this right would not apply in the context of other 
libraries.  Further, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that “the Court 
has recognized a limited version of that right in other settings.”148  
Justice Rehnquist argued that the books are still available to students 
 
 140 Id. at 872. 
 141 Id. at 888. 
 142 Cross, supra note 2, at 865. 
 143 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Ingber, supra note 16, at 2.  The theme is the marketplace of ideas.  Id. 
 147 Pico, 457 U.S. at 887, 910. 
 148 Id. at 911. 
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outside of the school library.149  This argument, however, also 
distorted the real issue.  The First Amendment rights of citizens do 
not rest on their ability to speak in any forum.  Rather, the First 
Amendment is implicated when the citizens’ right to speak has been 
censored in a certain forum.  The same analysis applies to the First 
Amendment right to receive information; it should not matter if the 
audience can find the information elsewhere.  What matters most is 
that citizens are denied information due to government constraints 
and improper motives. 
Last, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over the motive 
requirement set forth by the plurality.  The Justice posited that if 
there is a true right to receive information, motive would not 
matter.150  Just as there is no absolute First Amendment right to speak, 
however, it follows there is not an absolute right to receive 
information.  The improper motive requirement is what makes this 
case about the First Amendment.  Without it, the case would merely 
concern decisions unrelated to speech, such as removing a book 
because of its condition. 
The strengths of the right to receive information outweigh the 
weaknesses explored in Pico.  As such, Pico paves the way to invoke the 
right in other library cases.  This can be seen particularly in cases not 
involving libraries in public schools, where the dissent’s position that 
the right to receive information should not apply in school libraries is 
inapplicable. 
II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS 
The distinction between positive and negative rights is 
deceptively simple.  Many scholars have attempted to define them, 
but they do not agree on the details.151  Professor Cross proposed 
what may be the most satisfactory test for distinguishing them.  “[I]f 
there was no government in existence, would the right be 
automatically fulfilled?”152  If there is no government in place and the 
 
 149 Id. at 915. 
 150 Id. at 917-18. 
 151 Gerald MacCallum wrote one of the first philosophical essays regarding the 
distinction between positive and negative rights.  Cross, supra note 2, at 865.  “He 
contended that all rights issues fit a triadic relationship: ‘x is (is not) free from y to 
do (not do, become, not become) z.”  Id. (citing Gerald MacCallum, Jr., Negative and 
Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312, 314 (1967)).  X is the actor, Y prevents the action, 
and Z is the action.  Id. 
 152 Id. at 866.   
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right is fulfilled, that right would be a negative right; however, if 
government action is necessary to fulfill the mandate, then the right 
is considered positive.153  For the purpose of this Comment, the 
definition of a positive right is a “right to command government 
action,”154 while a negative right is “a right to be free from 
government.”155 
The debate surrounding the difference between positive and 
negative rights hinges on whether the Constitution’s text even 
recognizes positive rights.156  The standard view is that the 
Constitution is “a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”157  
Many scholars, however, such as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, 
argue that the Due Process Clause does include positive rights.158  
They assert that states must make courts available to enforce contract 
rights, that government must create trespass laws to enforce 
protection against takings, and that liberty includes providing police 
protection.159 
Professor Cross rejects their contentions on the basis of Supreme 
Court decisions and on a different interpretation of the text of the 
Constitution.160  Currently, no Supreme Court case recognizes positive 
rights, although the Court has noted the distinction between positive 
and negative rights.161  In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services,162 the Court stated that “our cases have recognized that 
the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may 
not deprive the individual.”163 
There are many reasons why positive rights would cause 
 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 864. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Cross, supra note 2, at 864.  “Although the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference . . . , it does 
not confer an entitlement to such [government assistance] as may be necessary to 
realize all the advantages of that freedom.”  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 
(1980). 
 157 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 158 See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS 52-54 (1999). 
 159 Id. at 52-56. 
 160 Cross, supra note 2, at 872. 
 161 Id. at 874. 
 162 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 163 Id. at 196. 
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difficulties if utilized. 
According to Professor Cross, 
[t]he recognition of positive rights holds out the prospect that the 
courts can be petitioned to intervene and compel such action, 
when the legislature fails to act sufficiently to advance the rights.  
Hence, the crucial issue is the effect of permitting judicial 
enforcement of these rights.  The inability of the judiciary to 
develop remedies that effectively enforce positive rights 
constitutes a reason not to recognize them.164 
Courts cannot enforce judicially-made rights without the support 
of the legislature; therefore, the politics of rights enforcement weigh 
against recognition.  The crux of the argument is that “it is futile to 
rely on the judiciary to provide basic welfare for the disadvantaged, if 
the political branches are unwilling to do so.”165  One of the primary 
reasons driving the limitations of the judiciary is that positive rights 
often require the government to spend money in enforcing the 
right.166  Considering the judiciary has no control over budgets and 
government money spent, requiring the government to enforce such 
a right is often not the business of the courts.167  The credibility of the 
courts could be at issue as the courts are unable to enforce a decision 
if the government chooses not to support it.168  Furthermore, the 
judiciary should not make it their function to create policy. 
Last, the economics of law enforcement weigh against 
recognition of positive rights.  In order to enforce positive rights, a 
plaintiff must have the ability to take advantage of the legal system, 
which requires the necessary resources.169  Generally speaking, the 
group of people most likely to bring an action to enforce a positive 
right is the poor.170  Unfortunately, that group is the one that 
 
 164 Cross, supra note 2, at 879. 
 165 Id. at 888. 
 166 Id. at 889. 
 167 Id.  See also Herman Schwartz, Recent Development: Do Economic and Social Rights 
Belong in a Constitution?, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1233, 1237 (1995). 
 168 Cross, supra note 2, at 889. “[T]he intractable economic, social and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the 
business of this Court.”  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). 
 169 Cross, supra note 2, at 880. 
 170 Id.  Professor Cross cites studies that identify six resources necessary for success 
in litigating for rights enforcement: (1) amount of money available, (2) support of 
the federal government, (3) ability to maintain the effort over long periods of time, 
(4) expert legal staff, (5) publicity and, (6) cooperation of other groups with similar 
interests.  Id. (citing LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 12-13 (1985)).  The study 
concludes that the best results occur when all six factors are present.  Id. 
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struggles most to afford the necessary representation to litigate such 
claims, especially considering those claims generally must end up in 
front of the United States Supreme Court.171  Therefore, the 
economics of positive right enforcement is another reason why 
positive rights are rarely recognized.  While negative rights also cost 
money to enforce, positive right enforcement requires the first step 
of recognition of that right, something the Court has not yet done, 
thereby proving fairly cost prohibitive for poorer groups more likely 
to try to bring a suit based on a positive right. 
For the above reasons, society has never fully embraced positive 
rights, nor have the courts recognized them.172  Applying the 
definition stated above to the right to receive information, the second 
category of cases requiring the government to force access to certain 
information falls into the category of a positive right.173  The audience 
would not hear the information in question unless the government 
acted to enable the dissemination.174  Therefore, based on that 
definition, the right to receive information, in certain contexts, is a 
positive right.  The framework for the right to receive information as 
a positive right is splintered and it is often difficult to predict how the 
Court will rule in a case depending on the medium of expression.175 
At first glance, the Pico decision appeared to be mandating 
positive rights; however, after further analysis, the decision in fact 
relied on negative rights as the government had already decided to 
provide the information before the public requested it.176  The 
difference between the right described in Pico and a positive right is 
that once the government makes certain information available, the 
government cannot later decide to make that information 
 
 171 Id.  “The key to effective rights enforcement is a ‘support structure for legal 
mobilization,’ which requires ‘rights-advocacy organizations, a diverse and 
organizationally sophisticated legal profession, a broad array of financing sources, 
and federal rights-advocacy efforts.’” Id. at 880 (quoting CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 69 (1998)). 
 172 Cross, supra note 2, at 879. 
 173 Id. at 866. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Compare Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (finding a First 
Amendment violation when a court closed voir dire proceedings), and Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (declaring a First Amendment right of 
access to court proceedings), with Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (denying 
the press the right to access prisons to observe conditions), and Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding regulations preventing the press from 
interviewing particular prisoners). 
 176 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72. 
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unavailable, thus relying on a negative right.177  Granting the public’s 
demand for that information once it is available is a negative right 
because the public is demanding what has already been given, not 
asking for information the government has not already chosen to 
make accessible.178  This is a strong use of the right, thus preventing a 
paternalistic government from having the ability to determine when 
all information in the government’s possession will be available.  So 
long as the information is in the public domain, the Court should 
continue to enable the public to have access to it, unless there is a 
compelling governmental interest for its removal.  In the analysis for 
removal, the Court would focus on the motives behind information 
removal to ensure only neutral reasons drive the decisions for 
removal. 
III. CURRENT USE OF THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION – 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
The Court decided the most recent case relating to the right to 
receive information in 2003.  United States v. American Library 
Association179 involved a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”).180  CIPA was designed to 
assist federal public libraries in providing Internet access to library 
patrons.181  The funding was conditioned upon the library installing 
filtering software designed to prevent access to obscenity and any 
other information deemed harmful to children.182  CIPA permits the 
library to set the filters to block certain categories of sites, such as 
those containing pornography or violence.183  The library has some 
 
 177 Id. 
 178 Cross, supra note 2, at 866. 
 179 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 180 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2004). 
 181 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 199.  There are two programs of federal 
assistance.  Id.  The first, the E-rate program allows libraries to buy discounted 
Internet access to make the acquisition more affordable.  Id.  The second program, 
pursuant to the Library Services and Technology Act gives grants to library agencies 
for Internet access.  Id. 
 182 Id.  The technology of library filters is far from perfect.  Id. at 208.  In many 
cases, the filters are both over and under inclusive, at times allowing information 
supposedly blocked to pass and at other time preventing protected information that 
should not be filtered.  Id.  The plurality appears to dismiss this issue, while Justice 
Kennedy and Justice Breyer acknowledge the problem.  Id. at 234, 238-39. 
 183 Id. at 200.  For a more detailed look at the technology of filters, see Junichi P. 
Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software vs. The First 
Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509 (2000); Glenn Kutoba, Public School Usage of Internet 
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flexibility and may set the filters to enable certain categories that 
might otherwise be blocked or to add or delete specific sites as 
necessary.184  The primary issue in the case revolved around whether 
CIPA’s filtering requirement violated the First Amendment rights of 
the libraries to choose content and also the First Amendment rights 
of the patrons to receive information.185  The district court found 
CIPA facially unconstitutional and enjoined the appropriate 
government agencies from withholding funding for those libraries 
that did not comply with CIPA’s filtering terms.186 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, upheld the constitutionality of CIPA, finding no 
impermissible restraints on First Amendment rights.187  The plurality 
equated a library’s right to choose what Internet sites should be 
available with its right to make content-based determinations to buy 
or not buy printed materials, and affirmed previous decisions 
regarding the broad discretion the library staff enjoys in choosing 
content.188  In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist first 
examined the role of public libraries in society and the relevant 
history driving a library’s mission to “facilitate learning and cultural 
enrichment.”189  After determining that public libraries do not 
provide “universal coverage,” Chief Justice Rehnquist analogized the 
library’s right to make content choices with the government’s right to 
determine what private speech should be made public.190  “Just as 
 
Filtering Software: Book Banning Reincarnated?, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 687 (1997). 
 184 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 200. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 202.  The court held the filters were a content-based restriction on access 
to a public forum and applied strict scrutiny.  Id. 
 187 Id. at 214. 
 188 Id. at 206.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).  Justice Souter argued 
against the majority opinion on grounds that the scarcity of resources which justifies 
choosing one book and not another does not apply to the Internet.  See Am. Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 235 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The library staff does not have to worry 
about finding enough space to house “the Internet” in that it does not take up 
physical space the way that books, periodicals or other printed materials do.  Id.  For 
this reason, the Court could have chosen, but did not, to treat the library staff’s 
discretion in the way they treated the Board of Education’s decision in Pico and 
scrutinize the filtering system closer. 
 189 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206.  Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the American 
Library Association’s Bill of Rights as the basis for the mission.  Id.  “[L]ibraries 
should ‘provide books and other resources for the interest, information, and 
enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves.’” Id. at 203-04 
(citation omitted). 
 190 Id. at 204-05.  Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Arkansas Educational Television 
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forum analysis and the heightened judicial scrutiny are incompatible 
with the role of public television states and the role of the NEA, they 
are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must 
have to fulfill their traditional missions.”191  Therefore, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist made no distinction between the library’s discretion in 
choosing printed materials and its discretion in providing access to 
certain web sites.192 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning essentially ignored the 
inherent difference in the manner in which Internet access and 
printed materials are chosen and provided.193  All printed materials 
are handpicked, primarily due to scarcity of resources and space.194  
The Internet, however, is a package and does not require a library to 
exercise discretion in choosing which sites are available.195  There is 
no space or scarcity of resources issues.196  While libraries do not have 
the time or space available to allow all library visitors to spend as 
much time as they want utilizing the computers, libraries also do not 
allow patrons to take out books indefinitely, nor can they allow 
patrons to sit and read the newspapers they offer all day.  Just as it 
would be improper for a library to cut up a newspaper and only 
provide the part the staff feels is proper, so is taking out parts of the 
Internet that the library previously purchased as a package.  So long 
as the information is available, the right to receive information is 
satisfied.  The Chief Justice’s opinion, rather, focused on the library’s 
traditional mission and equated the library’s mission of providing 
Internet access to its same mission for providing printed materials.197  
Therefore, the Court extended the same basis of review to libraries 
for content-based decisions for printed materials, rational basis 
review, as the Court extended for content-based decisions regarding 
 
Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 
524 U.S. 569 (1998), as support for his analogy.  Id.  The Forbes case, however, 
appears to contradict the Court’s decision in Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), a case 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to mention. 
 191 Id. at 205. 
 192 Id. at 208.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the library chooses to exclude 
pornography for its other collections, so the Internet should be no different.  Id. 
 193 Semitsu, supra note 183, at 527. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206.  The library’s traditional mission is “to 
facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of 
appropriate and requisite quality.”  Id. 
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Internet access.198 
Justice Kennedy concurred because he believed that a patron’s 
ability to disable the filters saves the law from facial 
unconstitutionality.199  The Justice was willing, however, to consider 
possible future challenges if a patron was able to show that protected 
speech had been blocked and the patron was unable to succeed in 
convincing a library representative to unblock the filter.  Justice 
Kennedy, however, was convinced by the remainder of the Chief 
Justice’s arguments and agreed that the compelling governmental 
interest of protecting young library users, coupled with the plaintiffs’ 
failure to show that adult library users are actually hindered in 
obtaining protected speech, supported the constitutionality of 
CIPA.200 
The plurality opinion did not address the right to receive 
information.  Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, recognized that 
right, but he ultimately agreed with the judgment of the plurality and 
upheld CIPA.201  Justice Breyer believed that because CIPA “directly 
restricts the public’s receipt of information,” heightened scrutiny is 
the correct standard to apply.202  The Justice declined to apply strict 
scrutiny because CIPA affects a library’s discretion in selection, 
creation, and maintenance of a collection.203  The Justice’s 
application ultimately balanced the importance of CIPA’s goals and 
the alternatives to meet those goals.204  Because he found no other 
means to filter the undesired information, Justice Breyer concurred 
in the judgment.  Justice Breyer’s application of heightened but not 
strict scrutiny takes away some of the protection defenders of the 
right to receive information would like it to receive.205 
Two dissents appear in the case, the first written by Justice 
Stevens.206  Justice Stevens viewed this case from the library’s 
perspective and found CIPA to be an unconstitutional restraint on 
the library’s First Amendment rights, arguing that judgments about 
what material to make available and how are better left to local 
 
 198 Id. at 210. 
 199 Id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 202 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 216. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 217. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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governments to narrowly tailor a solution fitting the issue.207  Justice 
Stevens’s opinion focused on the less restrictive alternatives 
available,208 rather than the current technology that both over- and 
under-blocks209 certain web sites.210  Because CIPA hindered the 
library’s discretion to choose its materials, the government’s action 
forcing the filters in order to obtain funding unconstitutionally 
restrains the library’s First Amendment rights.211 
The second dissent, written by Justice Souter and joined by 
Justice Ginsberg, took a different perspective, considering CIPA from 
the perspective of the library patron, or the audience.212  Justice 
Souter took issue with the potential overblocking of protected sites, 
as it would be unconstitutional for a library to restrict an adult’s 
access to protected sites despite CIPA’s mandate.213  Justice Souter 
equated filtering with censorship, rejecting the plurality’s analysis 
that equated filters with a library’s selection of available materials.214  
Therefore, Justice Souter distinguished a library’s discretion in 
choosing print materials and in choosing Internet access.215  He 
argued that a library has greater discretion in choosing print 
materials because of space and money constraints.216  Neither of these 
issues are of concern in regards to Internet access.217  As a result, 
 
 207 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 223 n.3. 
 208 See infra Conclusion. 
 209 “Over-blocking” and “under-blocking” are terms of art referencing the 
propensity of the filtering software to either incorrectly block sites that should not be 
blocked, or incorrectly display websites that should have been blocked, respectively.  
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 223 n.3. 
 210 Id. at 223-24.  Like the District Court, Justice Stevens cited the alternatives that 
are available at a local level.  Id. at 223.  These alternatives include library 
enforcement of policies that do not allow access to obscenity, requiring parental 
consent for minors to use Internet terminals, privacy screens, recessed monitors, and 
hidden placement of Internet terminals.  Id. 
 211 Id.  “The effect of the overblocking is the functional equivalent of a host of 
individual decisions excluding hundreds of thousands of individual constitutionally 
protected messages from Internet terminals located in public libraries throughout 
the nation.”  Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 212 Id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 213 Id.  Justice Souter did not find the Solicitor General’s assurances that a library 
patron could ask to unblock a site as convincing as the plurality did.  Id.  The Justice 
cited the FCC’s failure to set federal policy for local libraries to know when 
unblocking would be suitable.  Id. 
 214 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 235. 
 215 Id. at 236-37. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id.  The Internet is purchased as a package, rather than selected one site at a 
time.  Id.  Therefore, filtering is more like removal, and less like selection.  Id. 
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there should be different levels of scrutiny to determine if a library 
patron’s First Amendment rights have been abridged depending on 
the type of material that the library is selecting. 
The proper analogy therefore is not to passing up a book that 
might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then 
keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable ‘purpose,’ or to 
buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything 
thought to be unsuitable for all adults.218 
Therefore, Justice Souter would have applied strict scrutiny to CIPA 
and would have found that the filtering requirement violated an 
adult patron’s First Amendment rights.219 
CONCLUSION 
The right to receive information is a corollary of the right to 
speak, meaning that audience rights stem from speaker rights.220  The 
common theme in the first category of cases discussed in Part I is the 
government’s attempt to prevent otherwise protected speech.221  The 
attempts to prevent such speech occur in various ways, including 
specific criminal statutes, censorship of mail, and limitations on 
corporation expression.222  In balancing the competing interests in 
those cases, it is clear that if the speech is protected, the government 
customarily has no place regulating the dissemination of information.  
Therefore, the Court should utilize the right to receive information 
going forward to prevent governmental barriers to protected 
information, in line with years of strong precedent. 
The second category of cases represents the rare case where the 
government, due to limitations on broadcast frequencies, will require 
the press to make information available to the public.223  This small 
set of cases is unlikely to be duplicated, thus the analysis should not 
be used in the future, especially given the advent of new technology.  
The final category of cases has the potential to permit audience use 
 
 218 Id. at 237. 
 219 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 242-43. 
 220 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); 
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 221 See discussion supra Part I.A (describing the history of the right to receive 
information in the context of prevention of government barriers to protected 
information). 
 222 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 223 See discussion supra Part I.B (describing the press cases relating to the Fairness 
Doctrine). 
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of the right to receive information to claim access to information in 
the government’s possession.  To compel the government to give the 
public access to information in its possession requires reliance on a 
positive right.224  Because of the judiciary’s limited capacity to enforce 
such rights, reliance on a positive right is not a strong use of the right 
to receive information.225  Within this category of cases, however, are 
opinions that prevent the government from giving information and 
then later taking it away.  This group of opinions represents a second 
strong application of the right to receive information.226 
Once the government chooses to make the information 
available, the right to receive that information prevents the 
government from later taking that information away from the 
public.227  The decision to permit the information to be public is one 
that has already been made; therefore, any action to ensure that the 
information remains public would rely on a negative right.228  Here, 
the action would essentially be similar to the first group of cases 
preventing governmental barriers to information. 
A natural case to reference in the Court’s American Library 
Association decision would have been Pico, as removal of websites is 
the equivalent to the removal of books.229  The plurality, however, 
chose to reject the analogy and instead determined that the two are 
not related.230  The dissent recognized this analogy and applied strict 
scrutiny, in line with precedent.231  The plurality misapplied 
precedent by ignoring the similarity in facts to Pico.  In Pico, the Court 
prevented the government from improperly removing books from 
the school library it had already chosen to acquire.232  In American 
Library Association, the Court should have prevented the government 
from removing websites it had already chosen to acquire.  The 
 
 224 See discussion supra Part II (defining positive rights and applying the analysis to 
the right to receive information). 
 225 Cross, supra note 2, at 872. 
 226 See discussion supra Part I.B (distinguishing between cases where the 
government is required to provide information and cases where the government had 
already provided the information and then attempts to take that information away). 
 227 Pico, 457 U.S. at 868. 
 228 See discussion supra Part II (defining positive rights and applying the analysis to 
the right to receive information). 
 229 See discussion supra Part III (providing a detailed account of the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Library Association). 
 230 See discussion supra Part III. 
 231 See discussion supra Part III. 
 232 Pico, 457 U.S. at 872. 
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Internet is purchased as a package thus giving access to all available 
sites. Therefore, public libraries should not have free reign to pick 
and choose which websites should be publicly available.  It is up to 
the patron to make content choices, rather than having the library 
limit those choices improperly.  As Justice Souter stated, “[D]eciding 
against buying a book means there is no book (unless a loan can be 
obtained), but blocking the Internet is merely blocking access 
purchased in its entirety and subject to unblocking if the librarian 
agrees.”233  The dissent’s analogy is the correct application of the right 
to receive information; once the library chooses to obtain content, 
the library should not be permitted to later remove that content. 
Furthermore, the government can meet the goal of CIPA, to 
protect children from harmful messages, through less restrictive 
means without infringing the right to receive information.234  For 
example, a library can choose to permit certain computers to be 
available for use by children.  Those computers could contain filters 
and be located in the children’s section, while other computers in the 
library for adult use would be free from filters and located in a 
separate section of the library.  Second, the library can institute a 
policy only enabling children to use the Internet with adult 
supervision, thereby dispensing with the need for filters.  Finally, the 
library can make a strict policy that forbids anyone from making 
obscene or harmful information available to children.  Anyone found 
to violate this policy, enforced by other patrons and library staff, 
would be denied access to the library.  Any of these suggestions would 
be a less restrictive way to accomplish the goals of CIPA and protect a 
library patron’s First Amendment rights.235 
Ideally, the strongest case application for the right to receive 
information is to extend free speech rights to speakers and 
audiences, unless the government has a compelling interest.  The two 
categories, preventing barriers and precluding government from 
withholding previously accessible information, are the two strongest 
applications.  The decision in American Library Association, however, 
has undermined the right in the second context despite the 
plurality’s attempts to distinguish the facts in Pico.  The decision to 
disregard the clear similarities between the two cases ignores the fact 
that once the government chooses to make access to the Internet in 
 
 233 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 237. 
 234 Id. at 223. 
 235 See id. 
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public libraries available, the government should not improperly 
determine which websites to make available.  Despite the American 
Library Association decision, the Court should continue to use this 
conceptual framework and apply the right to receive information to 
prevent the government from creating barriers to information and to 
inhibit the government from acquiring information for public use 
and later attempting to improperly remove public access to that 
information. 
 
